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USING GRAPHIC FEEDBACK TO ELIMINATE CHECKLIST SEGMENT TIMING ERRORS
William G . Rantz

Abstract
This study examined whether pilots initiated paper or digital checklist use from environmental prompts
accurately when they receive post-flight graphic and limited verbal feedback. Participants were 6 college students who
are pilots with instrument rating. The task consisted of flying a designated flight pattern using a Frasca 241 Cirrus
Flight Training Device. The dependent variable was the percentage of paper and digital checklist segments initiated
at the proper time. A single-subject, alternating treatment, multiple baseline design with withdrawal and delayed
probes was employed in this study. During baseline, participants were given only post-flight technical skills feedback.
During intervention, participants were given both technical skills feedback and post-flight graphic feedback on both
paper and digital checklist use and praise for improvements. A probe was used between 60-90 days to assess any
decrement in participant's performance. The intervention produced highly improved paper and digital checklist timing
performance, which improved to nearly perfect following the withdrawal of treatment and increased to perfect
performance through the probe sessions.
Introduction
In aviation, the checklist is used during different
segments of flight to sequence specific, time critical tasks
and aircraft configuration adjustments that correspond to
specific environmental demands (Degani & Wiener, 1990).
It is divided into sub-sections with task checklists that
correspond to all flight segments and, in particular, critical
segments such as take off, approach, and landing.
The complexity of these task checklists cannot be
overstated. Standard procedures common to some cockpits
are not compatible with other cockpits or with newer
generation cockpits. Additionally, the task lists can be very
long. For example, on some checklists, the "before engine
start" sub-section has 76 items for the first flight of the day,
and 37 items for subsequent flight segments (Degani &
Wiener, 1990). Thus, it is not surprising that many aviation
experts have addressed their importance and design, as well
as the practices and policies that surround their use
(Adamski & Stahl, 1997; Degani, 1992, 2002; Degani &
Wiener 1990; Federal Aviation Administration [FAA],
1995, 2000; Gross 1995; Turner, 2001). Even so, the
incorrect use of flight checklists is still often cited as the
probable cause or a contributing factor to a large number of
crashes (Degani, 2002; Degani & Wiener, 1990; Diez,

Boehm-Davis, & Holt, 2003; Turner, 2001). Crew errors
have been recorded by observers using the Line Oriented
Safety Audit that recorded checklist behaviors throughout
the flight (Helmreich, n.d.; Helmreich, Klinect, Wilhelm, &
Jones, 1999;Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001).
Between 1997 and 1998, LOSAs were conducted at three
airlines with 184 flight crews on 314 flight segments.
Seventy-three percent of the flight crews committed errors.
The number of errors ranged fkom zero to fourteen per
flight, with an average of two. Rule-compliance errors were
the most frequently occurring errors, accounting for fiftyfour percent of all errors (Helmreich, n.d.; Helmreich et al.,
2001). Checklist errors constituted the highest number of
errors in this category. Similarly, many investigations by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have revealed
that the aircraft were not properly configured for flight,
which usually results from improper checklist use (NTSB,
1969, 1975, 1982, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1990,1997, 1998,
2001, 2002, 2003% 2003b, 2004% 2004b, 2006, 2007%
2007b, 2008% 2008b, 2008c, 2008d).
Checklist devices or methods of presentations are
described as paper, laminated paperlcard, scroll paper,
electromechanical, vocal, and computer-aided/electronic.
The most common method of presentation for checklists is

-
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the laminated paperlcard (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Turner
& Huntley, 1991). While this statement may be true for all
general aviation aircraft manufactured in the last one
hundred years, the rise of lower cost computing hardware
and software is rapidly changing how newer aircraft present
checklists (Boorman, 2001% 2001b). Within the last two
decades, electronic or digital checklists have appeared on
many regional and major airline flight decks, and their use
is rapidly increasing in some general aviation aircraft. These
digital checklists are integrated into the new aircraft panel
by the manufacturer with software designed to exclude
many paper checklist errors observed in past studies (Arkell,
2006; Boorman, 2001% 2001b). In Degani and Wiener
(1990), they found
the current paper checklists have a
number of design weaknesses. These
problems included the lack of a pointer to
the current checklist item, the inability to
mark a skipped item, and difficulties in
getting lost while switching between
checklists. The field study on paper
checklists identified a number of
problems with paper checklists that may
be alleviated with the use of an electronic
checklist. (p. 2)
While the claim that using electronic checklists
over traditional paper checklists will reduce or eliminate
most paper checklist errors may be true, Boorman was
concerned that without an automated alarm to alert pilots,
even the electronic checklist will not prevent omitted
checklists (Boorman, 2001a, p. 5). Thus, certain errant
behavior of the pilot is still a source of consternation to the
human factors engineer which automation may not cure.
Since Boorman's study was a review of accident data and
not an empirical study comparing the different performances
resulting fi-om different checklist presentations, its
generality is limited. However Boorman states:
Significant changes in crew training, pilot
demographics, airplane technology, and
the air traffic environment have and will
continue to take place. Will the context of
checklisterrors, and indeed checklists, be
significantly altered in the future? An
answer to this question is available: the
fundamental role of checklists, to ensure
that critical crew actions are
accomplished at critical points in a flight,
is likely to remain valid; and decreasing
the chance of errors in the
accomplishment of those actions will
continue to benefit flight safety. (p. 6)
As avionics prices continue to decline, it is very
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likely more digital checklists will be installed on smaller
general aviation aircraft, thereby expanding the
demographics of the pilot users &om airline professional to
recreational novice. It is still challenging to ensure pilots
understand that the checklist is a textual presentation
method by which flight deck safety is enhanced.
There is limited theoretical discourse regarding
methods to improve checklist behavior using behavioral
interventions. Rantz (2002) outlines one potential design
concept that uses antecedents, targeted behavior, and
consequences to address poor checklist performance and
crew performance. A recent study by Rantz, Dickinson,
Sinclair, and Van Houten (2009) demonstrated a behavioral
intervention designed to increase the appropriate use of
flight checklists. Rantz et al. examined eight instrumentrated students fi-om an accredited collegiate flight program
by measuring paper checklists errors using a personal
computer aviation training device (PC-ATD). Participants
used a Cessna C-172 paper flight checklist while flying
radar vectors fi-om takeoff to an instrument landing system
approach and landing. During baseline, overall average
checklist items were completed correctly 53% of the time.
After a behavioral intervention of graphic feedback and
praise for checklist improvement,performance improved to
98% items correct. Once feedback was withdrawn,
performance remained high until the end of the study, with
an average of 99% items correct. The importance of this
study is the focus on changing the behavior of the pilots
regarding checklist use.
In this study, post-flight graphic feedback
and praise increased checklistcompliance
to near perfect levels. This is the first
time this type of behavioral intervention
has been used to alter checklist use.
(Rantz et al., 2009, p. 20)
From the accident reports and LOSA data, errors in
using traditional paper or digital checklists have and
continue to plague the industry. Given the number of
aviation studies devoted to checklist use and how tasks are
conducted on the flight deck, an extensive search of the
aviation checklist literature revealed only one study that has
examined (a) whether the traditional paper checklist could
be used as a dependent variable, and (b)whether behavioral
interventions could increase the appropriate use of flight
checklists (Rantz et al., 2009).
The future challenge seems to be developing
reliable training curricula which recognize and reinforce
checklistuse regardless of its presentationmethod. Training
methods must consider the occasional misguided attending
behavior of the pilot or the lack of stimuli prompt
recognition. While misguided attending behavior or
distractions absolutely increase the risk in not recognizing
checklist prompts, so to does the lack of consistent training
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and reinforcement in developing reliable checklist prompt
comprehension. Both misguided attending behavior and
prompt comprehension may contribute to the low
performance of consistent checklist use as observed in the
LOSA data. This study attempts to improve both paper and
digital checklist errors and thereby improve checklist
segment timing.
Method
Participants
Participants were six undergraduate students
enrolled in collegiatecommercial flight courses.Participants
volunteered from the commercial ground class which is
taken after the private certificate and the instrument rating
is earned. No monetary compensation was given to
participate in the study. During the study participants
maintained anonymity between fellow participants, flight
instructors, and faculty. Criteria for inclusion included a
private pilot certificate, instrument rating, and having
experience in either a Frasca 241 and have at least been
checked out for solo using actual flight time in the Cirrus
SR20 aircraft.Participants averaged 186 total flight hours of
which an average of 80 hours were in the Cirrus aircraft or
FTD.
Setting
The Flight Training Devise (FTD) and observation
camera equipment was located in a hanger used exclusively
to train collegiate flight students. Within the FTD area,
enclosed structuresrestricted the vision of the participant to
only the simulator. Neither the observation area nor
equipment, excluding the video cameras, were visible to the
participants.
Apparatus
The Frasca 24 1 FTD equipment was produced by
Frasca International in Champaign, IL. The aircraft shell
consists of the Cirrus aircraft forward cowling and flight
deck with operating doors. The flight deck is open aft of the
fi-ont seats to allow for observation during training near the
instructor station. The graphic instructor station (GIST)
software permitted the simulation of both the SR20 and the
SR22 aircraft. The Cirrus SR20 was chosen due to its
increasing popularity in general aviation as well as the fact
that it was the primary aircraft used in the collegiate training
fleet. The GIST simulation software automatically recorded
technical flight skill parameters, such as vertical and
horizontal progress and enabled those tracks to be printed
for technical skills feedback.
Flightpatterns. For random variability there were
six different flight patterns used for this study (Appendix
A). Each flight pattern was divided into eight segments: (a)
before takeoff, (b) normal takeoff, (c) climb, (d) cruise, (e)
descent, (f) before landing, (g) after landing, and @I)
shutdown. Each segment corresponds to the eight checklist
segments used for each radar vectored instrument approach
flight. To realistically simulate actual flight patterns and
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insure that the patterns were flown in a consistent way
across trials and participants, the experimenter provided
typical air traffic control instructions throughout each flight
pattern. These scripted instructions were transmitted using
a headset system.
The flight checklist. The digital and paper
checklists each contained 70 identical checklist items
divided into sections that corresponded to each of the eight
flight segments. Using the Cirrus checklist ensures the
aircraft is properly configured for the appropriate phase of
flight. Each checklist segment must be completed at certain
moments in time, which should be standardized fiom flight
to flight.
Independent Variable
The independent variable was the presence or
absence of post-flight (a) graphic feedback on the total
number of checklist items completed correctly per flight, (b)
graphic feedback on the number of items completed
correctly, completed incorrectly, or omitted for each of the
eight flight segments per flight and (c) praise for
improvement in the number of checklist items completed
correctly.
Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable was the overall
average percentage of paper and digital checklist segments
participants completed incorrectly per flight. For an item to
be scored "correct," participants had to respond, or begin to
use the appropriate checklist segment at the appropriate time
during the flight.
Experimental Design
A single-subject, alternating treatment, multiple
baseline design with withdrawal and delayed probe was
employed in this study. The intervention was introduced to
the participants at different times, only after it was apparent
that baseline performance was stable. The power of the
design assumes if a baseline changes after the intervention
was given, the effect can be attributed to the intervention
and not extraneous variables. This design was chosen for
several reasons; (a) the ability to making causal statements,
(b) relatively small number of participants required, (c)
visually demonstrate independenteffects of intervention,(d)
visually demonstrate the magnitude and applied significance
of the intervention (Kazdin, 1982). Sessions lasted
approximately two hours, and participants flew four
different flight patterns in each session. Each flight was
considered a trial. The order of exposure to the six flight
patterns was randomized for each participant to ensure no
flight pattern was repeated during any one session. A
withdrawal of treatment phase was included to assess
whether checklist timing segment performance would be
maintained after the post-flight feedback was withdrawn. A
probe phase between sixty and ninety days was used to see
if there was a long term decline in checklist segment timing
performance.

Page 25

25

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 20, No. 1 [2010], Art. 8

Improving Checklist Use
Procedures
Baseline Phase. Participants were informed their
behavior during each flight trial would be observed and
recorded using the pre-positioned video cameras as well as
an observer checklist (Appendix B). For each flight trial
they were given automated terminal information concerning
the weather and airport conditions, the Cirrus approved
paper checklist, as well as the official ILS approach plate
used to execute the instrument approach. Before the
beginning of each session of four trials, a digital or paper
checklist was randomly assigned for the first trial and the
remaining three trials alternated between paper and digital
checklists. Additionally, they were told that the
experimenter would provide them with some post-flight
information alter each flight and that it would take him
about 5 minutes to prepare that material.
After the participant completed a flight, the
experimenter printed out the vertical and horizontal flight
path just flown by the participant. This provided the
participant with technical flight skills feedback one would
expect in a normal simulator instruction session. No
comments were made regarding the previous checklist use.
The technical diagram was reviewed with the participant.
This protocol was repeated for each flight during the
baseline phase.
Intervention Phase. In addition to giving
participants the technical diagram feedback that depicted
critical flight parameters after each flight, the experimenter
provided graphic feedback on the use of the flight checklist.
After each flight trial, the experimenter immediately
calculated the number of checklist items completed
correctly, entered it into the computer, and printed a line
graph that displayed the number of correctly completed
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items for each trial, including the accumulated trials the
participant had completed during baseline (Figure 1). All
data to the left of the vertical dotted line in Figure 1
represent baseline performance and all data to the right of
the vertical dotted line represent intervention performance.
The experimenter also entered the number of checklist items
completed correctly, completed incorrectly, and omitted for
each of the eight flight segments for that particular flight,
and printed a bar graph that displayed those data. The bar
graph also included the total number of possible correct
checklist items for each segment as well (Figure 2). The
experimenter first showed the technical flight diagram to the
participant and discussed the technical merits of the flight.
He then showed the two checklist feedback graphs to the
participants and praised any improvements. No detailed
feedback was given to the participant, such as which
particular checklist item(s) were performed as incorrect or
omitted or errors on timing of checklist segments. This
protocol was repeated for each flight during intervention.
Once a participant reached 95% correct for all checklist
items, for three consecutive trials in either paper or digital,
the intervention phase was terminated.
Withdrawal Phase. This phase was identical to the
baseline phase in which only technical feedback was given
to the participant. Graphic feedback was no longer provided
for checklist performance after each flight.
60-90 Day Post-Test Probe. An over 60 day probe
past the end of the withdrawal phase was used to assess
performance decrements over longer periods of nonexposure to the feedback condition. Four alternating trials
were done using both paper checklists (2) and digital
checklists (2). Only technical feedback was given.
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Figure 1. Line feedback graph of both paper and digital checklist items performed correctly.
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Figure 2. Bar feedback graph of one trial during intervention.
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errors occurred during that phase. Only paper checklist
segments which resulted in segment timing errors are list on
the left. The bottom row is the average percent error of each
participant's checklist segment performance within each
phase. While this percent is not of much use for actual
performance feedback to the participant, it can be used to
compare between participants' performance. This
comparison illustrates the variability of performance
between participants during baseline it also shows,
excluding participant 1, the reduction in segment timing
error during the intervention phase. All paper checklist
segment timing errors were eliminated during the
withdrawal and probe phase.

Results
Data collection took approximately 64 sessions
which included 256 flight trials. 2,45 1 total paper checklist
errors were observed and 2,562 total digital checklist e m
were observed. During the study 75 paper segment timing
errors occurred while 66 digital segment timing errors
occurred. Due to the experimental design, homogeneity
could not be maintained regarding the number of trials
within phases between participants. Therefore result
comparisons are expressed in percent of error.
Table 1 lists each participant, under which are
columns for baseline (B), intervention (I), and withdrawal
(W) phases. The probe phase is not listed since no timing

Table 1. Participants Paper Checklist Segment Timing Errors Per Phase

B

I

W

B

I

W

B

Climb

0

0

0

67%

13%

0

22%

Cruise

0 2 0 % 0 1 7 % 0

I

W

B

I

W

B

I

W

B

I

W

0

0

0

17%

0

50%

0

0

92%

0

0

0 1 1 % 0

0
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0

0

0

0

0

2

5

%

0

0

Descent

20%

0

0

50%

13%

0

33%

17%

0

56%

17%

0

67%

0

0

33%

0

0

Before
Landing

20%

20%

0

0

13%

0

67%

17%

0

56%

17%

0

75%

0

0

17%

0

0

Data fiom Table 2 representsthe same performance
measures as Table 1 except it is displaying digital checklist
segment timing errors across each participant per phase. As
with paper checklist, similar performance occurred for
participants across each phase using the digital checklist.
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One exception was participant 2 in which one timing error
did occur in the descent segment during the withdrawal
phase. However all participants eliminated digital checklist
segment timing errors during the probe phase.
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Table 2. Participants Digital Checklist Segment Timing Errors Per Phase

P1

P3

P2

B

I

W

B

I

W

B

Climb

0

0

0
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0

0
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20%

0

17%
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Landing

20% 20%

0

rNDIV
AVG%
per Phase

20%

0
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Figure 3 displays the overall average percentage
of paper checklist segment timing errors for all
participants over all trials. For all the paper checklist
trials, no segment timing errors were observed for the
Before Takeoff, Normal Takeoff, After Landing, and
Shutdown segments. Therefore these segments were
excluded from the graph. The paper checklist had the
highest overall average percentage of timing errors during
the descent phase at 43 percent error over all trials. The
before landing had a 39 percent timing error rate followed
by the climb segment with a 38 percent timing error rate.
The lowest timing error rate was for the cruise segment at

I

P4

9 percent. Participants decreased the segment timing error
rates and increased performance accuracy over baseline
when post-flight checklist feedback was provided. During
the intervention phase the timing error rate for the before
landing phase was the highest at 11 percent. The
remaining segments showed improved performance with
reduced timing error rates for the descent (8%), climb
(5%), and the cruise (3%). Again, all segment timing
errors had been eliminated during the withdrawal phase as
no timing e m occurred after the graphic feedback
intervention was removed or during the over 60 day
probe.
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probe, participants may have forgotten or ignored the
prompts during the baseline phase or they may have
believed nothing aversive or bad would happen to them
while operating in a simulated flight environment and chose
to proceed in the most familiar manner possible.
A review of the collegiate private pilot training
curriculum revealed that training checklist use specifically
occurred during lessons 1-6 with level 1 for specific
performance criteria standards of checklist use and level 2
for preflight procedures for lesson 18-19. Performance
criteria standards are listed in Appendix C. However the
manual contained no evidence articulating formal follow up
assessment or feedback specifically for checklist use. A
further review of the collegiate instrument pilot training
curriculum showed checklist use was required during most
of the lessons. It appears that greater emphasis is being
placed on using and holding a higher criteria standard for
checklist use; however as with the private pilot curriculum,
there is no requirement for formal follow up assessment or
feedback specifically for checklist use during either
instructional of non-instructional flight.
Depending on the location of the aircraft during a
particular flight, salient stimuli should be obvious to the
flight crews that would prompt the start of particular
checklist segments. The Pilot Operating Handbook (POH)
(2003) for the Cirrus SR20 contains descriptors identifying
specific environmental stimuli for checklistprompts. Those
checklist segments include, a) before starting engine, paired
stimuli-prior to engine start, b) engine start, paired stimulistart engine, c) before taxi, paired stimuli-prior to taxi, d)
taxing, paired stimuli-during taxilafter taxi, e) before
takeoff, paired stimuli-at end of runwaylin run up area and
prior to takeoff, f) takeoff, paired stimuli-prior to takeoff, g)
climb, paired stimuli-1000 feet above the ground, h) cruise,
paired stimuli-reaching desired or assigned cruise altitude,
I) descent, paired stimuli-top of the descent into the
destination,j) before landing, paired stimuli-for visual flight
rules, downwind leg, for instrument flight rules, 2 nautical
miles prior to final approach fix, k) after landing, paired
stimuli-after clearing active runway, 1) shutdown, paired
stimuli-ready to shutdown. Perhaps while reading the Cirrus
SR20 POH, pilots memorize these prompts, again no
evidence of assessing the understanding of these prompts
could be found in the curricular documents. Similar studies
in behavior-based safety research have observed that using
antecedents alone, or rules designed to improve safe
behavior are not as effective as one would expect (Austin,
Alvero, & Olson, 1998; Engerman, Austin, & Bailey, 1997;
Ludwig & Geller, 1997; Olson & Austin, 2001; Streff,
Kalsher, & Geller, 1993). Thus, rule statements regarding
the importance of consistent checklist use may be, at best,
problematic. Given this condition, combined with the
difficulty of finding checklist rule statements within the
training lessons and no periodic checklist assessments,

unclear rule-based objectives for proper checklist use may
result in poor performance regardless of the checklist
presentation format.
Only the line and bar graphic feedback (Figures 1
& 2) and limited praise for improvement was given to the
participants. Specific verbal feedback accentuating which
items were missed and which environmental prompts were
needed to improve segment timing were not provided to the
participants. During the post-flight period, participants
examined and compared what the graphs indicated with
what they recalled from their most recent performance. For
example if the bar graph (Figure 2) indicated they had
incorrectly completed all 6 items of the descent checklist,
yet they recollected that they had actually completed all 6
items in the descent checklist, this likely resulted in the
participant making a rule statement. One such statement
may have been, "I know I did all 6 checklist items in the
descent as required yet the graph indicates those 6 items as
being done incorrectly. The only possible conclusion to get
all 6 items incorrect is to begin the descent checklist at the
wrong time". This likely explains the error reduction effects
during the intervention phase where timing errors were not
immediately eliminated.Repeated trials using trial and error
may have given the participant time to reason out the new
rule statements and perhaps given those more lasting new
rule impressions for future checklist use. While vague
feedback may not seem to be the most efficient method to
correct errors, it may have a profound effect on longer term
maintenance of correct behavior.
The only problematic overall error rate of 3 percent
timing error occurred while using the digital checklist in the
descent segment of the withdrawal phase. While this is a
very low overall average timing error, it may indicate some
timing difficulty such as a distraction while using the digital
checklist prior to the descent. However the end results
demonstrated complete elimination of all digital checklist
segment timing errors during the post 60 day probes. Since
all participantseliminated all timing errors during the 60 day
probes; was it due to the contingency shaping caused by the
graphic feedback, new rule statements, recalling old rule
statements, or a combination of them all? There is strong
evidence that the applied significance of the intervention
reached criteria for proper timing for both paper and digital
checklist. This accomplishment is evident given that all
segment timing errors were eliminated by the end of the
study.
Given the results of the current study, more
research is required to determine, to what extent new rules
form under a feedback intervention and specifically how
those new rules influence long term checklist behavior.
Possible future research should pair a modified checklist
curriculum, employing periodic assessment of checklist use
and graphic feedback in simulated or actual flight.
Since this study was conducted in a normal
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workload environment, further study should examine
increasing the workload demands of the pilots to determine
if increased distractions cause higher errors using either
paper or digital checklists. Even while operating in a normal
workload condition, many timing errors occurred during
elevated workload segments of the checklist. Generally
these segments included the climb, descent and before
landing portions. Providing increased workload may reveal
greater differences in checklist performance given how the
checklist is presented. Increased workload may also evaluate
the effectiveness of the feedback intervention package
regarding initial effect sizes and duration of effect.
While both paper and digital checklists have their

strengths, the inherent potential weakness of each are
comprised of, a) the lack of pre-existing effective rule
statements regarding the consistent and proper use of the
checklist,b) the lack of salient stimuli recognition to prompt
the beginning of each checklist and, c) the lack of effective
reinforcers to increase and maintain checklist use.
The use of line and bar graphic feedback had a
direct effect on improving timing performance in both paper
and digital checklist formats. Given these results and the
importance of checklist use in the industry, flight training
professionals should review curricular methods used to,
educate, assess, and reinforce checklist use..)
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Appendix A
NORMAL WORKLOAD-Technical Flight Pattern Parameters and Narration
Flight Pattern 2 KAZO
(EXPERIMENTER): Session start, please begin. Contact tower when reaGfyfor takeof
Using flow pattern-Before Takeoff checks completed (31 checklist items)
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Tower Western 45 readyfor departure runway 35.
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 you are clearedfor departure. Fly runway heading climb and maintain 3,500 '.
(PARTICIPANT): Fly runway heading climb and maintain 3,500' Western 45
Using do-list-Normal Takeoff checks completed (5 checklist items)
After reaching 1000' AGL
Using flow pattern-Climb checks com~letedabove 1000' (5 checklist items)
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 contact Kalamazoo Approach on 121.2.
(PARTICIPANT): Contacting Kalamazoo Approach on 121.2 Western 45.
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Approach Western 45 is with you heading 350 climbing to 3,500'.
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 roger.
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left heading of 260.
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 260 Western 45.
Using flow pattern-Cruise checks complete after level at 3.500' (5 checklist items)
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left heading of 170 and descend to 3,000 '.
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 170 and descending to 3,000 ' Western 45.
Using flow pattern-Descent checks complete prior to IAP and 3,000'(6 checklist items)
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to a heading of 080.
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 080 Western 45.
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to a heading of 030 clearedfor the ILS 35 contact Kalamazoo Tower 118.3.
(PARTICIPANT): Contacting Kalamazoo Tower on 118.3 Western 45.
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Tower this is Western 45 on the ZLS 35.
(OBSERVER: Western 45 you are cleared to land runway 35.
(PARTICIPANT): Cleared to land runway 35 Western 45.
Using flow pattern-Before Landing checks complete prior to FAF (5 checklist items)
2 miles outside FAF-Power 50% 22" MP, flaps 50%, airspeed 100 knots, maintain 2,500' until established on the glide slope.
FAF inbound and established on glide slope-Power 25% 12" MP, flaps 50%, airspeed 100 knots, descent rate of 500 feet per
minute is established.
Short final-Power as required, flaps loo%, airspeed 75 knots over threshold of runway.
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to exit the active runway andpark
Using flow pattern-After Landing checks (6 items)
Usinn do-list-Shutdown checks (7 items)
(EXPERIMENTER): This session is over. Please relax and I will join you in afew minutes.
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Appendix C
Performance Criteria Standards
Level 0 - Unsatisfactory Performance
Knowledge - Student lacks an understanding or is experiencing difficulty with the concepts, skills, or procedures for
accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers. The student achieves less than 60% on written or oral tests.
Performance - Instructor intervention is required. Student is unable to accomplish the elements of the maneuver or is
unsafe while performing them even after re-teaching. Such minimal performance is a bar to further progress.
Level 1 - Instructor Demonstration - Student Performance
Knowledge - Student begins to understand concepts, skills, or procedures for
accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers. The student can achieve at least 60% on mitten or oral tests.
Performance - Student accomplishes elements or maneuvers by way of instructor direction, teaching, or re-teaching, and
with occasional instructor intervention.
Level 2 - Understanding with Occasional Instructor Assistance
Knowledge - Student demonstrates a 70% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests, usually applies
concepts, skills, or procedures for accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers.
Performance - The student understands and safely demonstrates elements and maneuvers consistentlyto within double
the standards found in the appropriate PTS with occasional instructor assistance. The student only needs additional
practice to meet PTS standards.
Level 3 - PTS Standard
Knowledge - Student consistently demonstrates a minimum 80% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests;
explanation of the elements and objectives of maneuvers; voluntarily evaluates and critiques hisher personal
performance.
Performance - Student consistently applies concepts and skills to accomplish lesson elements and maneuvers to
standards as referenced by the current PTS with minimal assistance and no instructor intervention. The student critiques
and evaluates personal performance.
Level 4 - Associating Knowledge to new Situations- Mastery of the Lesson
Knowledge - Student consistently demonstrates exceptional performance in both written and oral testing above and
beyond PTS. Student consistently demonstrates a minimum 90% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests,
explanation of the elements and the objectives of maneuvers.
Performance - Student consistently correlates concepts and skills, and demonstrates exceptional performance above and
beyond PTS. The student demonstrates attitude, ethics, and communication skills essential for professional flight crew
interaction.
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